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Contents May Have Shifted: 
Disentangling the Best Evidence Rule 
from the Rule Against Hearsay 
Colin Miller* 
Abstract 
The rule against hearsay covers a statement offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted but does not cover a statement 
offered for another purpose. Meanwhile, the Best Evidence Rule 
states that a party seeking to prove the content of a writing, 
recording, or photograph must produce the original or account for 
its nonproduction. Does this mean that the Rule is inapplicable 
when a party seeks to prove something other than the truth of the 
matter asserted in a writing, recording or photograph? Most 
courts have answered this question in the affirmative. This essay 
argues these courts are wrong. 
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I. Introduction 
In a divorce action in which a husband and wife vigorously 
argue over the distribution of marital assets and custody of their 
children, the wife seeks to testify that she read a torn-up printout 
of an e-mail sent from her husband to the wife’s sister.1 In the 
e-mail, the husband allegedly professes his love for his wife’s 
sister and his plan to divorce his wife and rendezvous with the 
sister.2 The husband’s attorney responds that the e-mail contains 
inadmissible hearsay and that testimony concerning the e-mail 
would violate the Best Evidence Rule because the wife failed to 
perform a diligent search for the email.3 According to the wife’s 
attorney, the purpose of the wife’s testimony is not to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted in the e-mail: that the husband was 
actually in love with the sister.4 Instead, the wife’s testimony 
would prove the effect of the e-mail on the wife’s state of mind 
and explain why the wife left her husband in Sudan and returned 
to the United States with the couple’s children.5 
The trial court deems the wife’s testimony admissible, and 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals later agrees, finding 
that the explanation given by the wife’s attorney killed two birds 
with one stone: First, the wife’s testimony about the e-mail did 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Associate Professor, 
University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/. 
 1. See Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 837 (D.C. 2012) (finding no 
abuse of discretion when a trial court admitted testimony regarding the content 
of an email that was not itself introduced into evidence). 
 2. See id. (paraphrasing defendant Mahmoud’s testimony regarding the 
email’s contents). 
 3. See id. 
Abulqasim argues that Mahmoud failed to satisfy her burden of 
proving that she performed a “diligent search for the email,” and that 
her only explanation—that she “ha[d] a whole lot of stuff 
stolen . . . from [her] while [she] was in Sudan . . . and [she] believe[d] 
one of them [wa]s the email”—was insufficient. 
 4. See id. (“In admitting Mahmoud’s testimony concerning the email, the 
court recognized that testimony about the contents of the writing was hearsay, 
but ruled that it was not being admitted to prove the truth of a romantic 
relationship between Abulqasim and his sister-in-law.”). 
 5. See id. at 837–38 (“The court exercised reasonable discretion by 
admitting the testimony as evidence only to the extent it explained Mahmoud’s 
actions . . . .”). 
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not violate the rule against hearsay because it merely “explained 
[the wife]’s actions and” was not admitted to prove “‘the truth of 
the matter asserted’—the matter asserted being that [the 
husband] and [the wife’s sister] were having a romantic 
relationship.”6 Second, immediately after this statement, the 
court concludes that, for the same reason, “the best evidence rule 
did not apply.”7 In other words, like many courts before it, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia conflates the rule 
against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule, finding neither rule 
implicated by the admission of evidence concerning a statement 
offered to prove something other than the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement.8 This Essay contends that this 
conflation reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Best 
Evidence Rule and that courts must disentangle that Rule from 
the rule against hearsay and find the Best Evidence Rule 
implicated whenever a party seeks to prove the content of a 
statement, a concept distinct from the truth of the matter 
asserted in a statement. 
II. The Rule Against Hearsay and the Truth of the Matter 
Asserted 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines “hearsay” as a 
statement that:  
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 
trial or hearing; and  
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement.9 
In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 deems hearsay 
inadmissible in the absence of an exclusion, exception, or federal 
statute.10 Rule 802 deems hearsay evidence presumptively 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (noting that most federal 
and state courts in similar cases have conflated the rule against hearsay and the 
Best Evidence Rule). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
CONTENTS MAY HAVE SHIFTED 189 
inadmissible both because such evidence is unreliable and 
because the jury has an inability to assess that unreliability at 
trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson v. United 
States,11 Rule 802: 
[I]s premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are 
subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he 
might have misperceived the events which he relates; he 
might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood 
or taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which 
these dangers are minimized for in-court statements—the 
oath, the witness’[s] awareness of the gravity of the 
proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’ 
demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to 
cross-examine—are generally absent for things said out of 
court.12 
Essentially, Rule 802 recognizes that the relevance of 
hearsay evidence depends upon two characteristics that the jury 
cannot adequately assess: the honesty and accuracy of the 
declarant when he made the subject statement.13 Imagine a case 
in which Dan is prosecuted for murdering Vince. Ed, an alleged 
eyewitness, told his friend Fred that he saw Dan shoot Vince, and 
the prosecution wants to call Fred to testify concerning Ed’s 
statement. Ed’s statement is only relevant to prove Dan’s guilt if 
Ed was being both honest and accurate when he made the 
statement. If Ed was lying in that he actually saw Carl shoot 
Vince, the statement would not tend to prove that Dan murdered 
Vince. Similarly, if Ed was inaccurate in that he thought that he 
saw Dan shoot Vince when it was in fact Carl who shot Vince, his 
statement would also lack relevance.  
If Ed takes the witness stand at trial and testifies that he 
saw Dan shoot Vince, the jury can assess his credibility after he 
takes the oath and is subjected to the crucible of cross-
                                                                                                     
 11. 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
 12. Id. at 598. 
 13. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 8:3 (4th ed. 2013) (noting these as two of the primary reasons why 
hearsay evidence is typically inadmissible); cf. State v. Walker, No. 1461, 1977 
WL 198855, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1977) (noting that the “official reports” 
exception to the rule against hearsay is premised upon the habit of honesty and 
accuracy of public officials in the performance of their duties).  
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examination.14 Conversely, if Ed’s statement were merely 
admitted through the testimony of Fred, the jurors would have to 
rely upon Fred’s assessment of Ed’s credibility when Ed made the 
statement rather than being able to draw their own conclusions, 
which is why Fred’s testimony is precluded by the rule against 
hearsay.15 
This analysis in turn explains why Rule 801(c)(2) 
circumscribes the definition of hearsay so that it only covers a 
statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.”16 If a party is not seeking to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in a statement, then the jury need not be 
concerned with the honesty and accuracy of the declarant when 
he made the subject statement.  
Imagine a different case in which Vince has brought a civil 
battery action against Dan based upon a physical encounter 
between the two men. Dan claims that he was acting in self-
defense and wants to testify at trial that Ed told him minutes 
before the encounter, “Vince is coming to see you to collect on that 
drug debt that you owe him.” If Dan is offering this statement to 
prove that Vince was in fact coming to see him to collect on the 
drug debt, the statement is classic hearsay as it is a statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.17 Indeed, if we 
assume that Ed’s statement must be based upon someone—likely 
Vince—telling him about Vince’s plan to collect on the drug debt, 
then the statement is hearsay within hearsay.18 
                                                                                                     
 14. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding that the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination”). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Pa. 
1945) (“The vice of such evidence is that the other person upon whose credibility 
the jury must rely is not present in court and cannot be subjected to cross-
examination.”). 
 16. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that . . . the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing[,] 
and . . . a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.”). 
 18. See FED. R. EVID. 805 (“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the 
rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an 
exception to the rule.”). 
CONTENTS MAY HAVE SHIFTED 191 
On the other hand, Dan could legitimately argue that he is 
offering the statement not to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted but to prove its effect on the listener, making it not 
hearsay.19 Specifically, Dan could claim that he is offering the 
statement to prove that, regardless of whether Ed was being 
honest or accurate when he made the statement, Dan had every 
reason to believe the statement, placing him in reasonable 
apprehension of Vince.20  
In this sense, Dan’s testimony would be no different than if 
Dan were to testify that he heard some other non-hearsay sound 
such as a dog barking or a doorbell ringing. The barking and the 
ringing are not hearsay because neither is a statement made by a 
person, and Dan could not call the dog or the doorbell to the 
witness stand to have the jury assess their credibility.21 Instead, 
the only question with such testimony would be whether Dan 
actually heard the dog barking or the doorbell ringing, making 
the admissibility of his testimony a question of personal 
knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 60222 and not a 
hearsay question under Rule 802.23 If it is irrelevant to the jury 
whether Ed was being honest and/or accurate when he made the 
subject statement, then Ed is the functional equivalent of the dog 
or the alarm clock, and there is no reason to call him to the 
witness stand. This is why courts regularly say that a statement 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(noting that “a statement offered to show its effect on the listener is not 
hearsay”). 
 20. See, e.g., State v. Silveira, 503 A.2d 599, 609 (Conn. 1986) (“If offered to 
show his reasonable apprehension of danger it is not offered for a hearsay 
purpose; its value for this purpose does not depend on the truth of the 
statement.” (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231, at 734 (Edward W. Cleary 
ed., 3d ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21. See Colin Miller, Hear Spot Bark: Washington Court of Appeals Rejects 
Argument That Dog Barking Constitutes Hearsay, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG, (Nov. 
15, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/11/hear-spot-
bark-.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) (discussing “animal hearsay”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 22. See FED. R. EVID. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter.”). 
 23. See FED R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (noting that a witness 
may testify to a fact that he or she actually observed). 
192 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 0000 (2014) 
is not hearsay if the only question is “whether the statement was 
made [and] not whether it was true.”24 
Another type of statement that is not hearsay because the 
sole concern is whether the statement was made is a statement of 
independent legal significance.25 One classic example of such a 
statement is a contract, which “is a verbal act.”26 Assume that 
Paul offers Dennis $500 if Dennis paints Paul’s house, and 
Dennis accepts Paul’s offer. If Paul later sues Dennis for breach 
of contract, Paul can testify concerning Dennis’s acceptance 
without regard to the rule against hearsay because Paul is not 
seeking to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Dennis 
actually intended to paint the house. When Dan agreed to Paul’s 
offer, he could have had every intention or no intention at all to 
paint the house, and it would not have mattered: When Dennis 
stated that he accepted Paul’s offer, it created a legally binding 
contract, regardless of what Dennis might have been thinking to 
himself.27  
A final type of statement that is not hearsay because the only 
concern is whether the statement was made is a statement 
offered to impeach a witness. Imagine in the prior example that 
Paul later sought to sell his house and had a realtor, Regina, over 
to look at his house while his neighbor, Ned, was present. At that 
time, Regina told Paul and Ned that the paint on his house 
looked fine and that it should not be a hindrance to Paul in 
selling his house. Thereafter, when Paul sues Dennis for breach 
of contract, Paul calls Regina to testify that one of the main 
reasons that Paul’s house had not sold and was still on the 
market was that the paint on his house looked terrible. If Dennis 
calls Ned to testify to Regina’s earlier statement, he could argue 
that he is offering the statement for a legitimate non-hearsay 
                                                                                                     
 24. Gleason v. Smolinski, No. NNHCV065005107S, 2012 WL 3871999, at 
*12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012). 
 25. See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 
540 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Signed instruments such as wills, contracts, and 
promissory notes are writings that have independent legal significance, and are 
nonhearsay.” (quoting THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 
180 (2d ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. (“Under the objective theory of contracts, the fact that two 
parties signed a contract is enough to create legal rights, whatever the 
signatories might have been thinking when they signed it.”). 
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purpose: to impeach Regina’s testimony by revealing to the jury 
the inconsistency between that testimony and her prior 
statement.28 Such impeachment is permissible under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 613 and is not hearsay under Rule 801 because 
it is offered to attack the credibility of the witness and not to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the prior statement: 
that the paint on the house actually looked fine.29 
III. The Best Evidence Rule and Proving the Content of a Writing, 
Recording, or Photograph 
The Best Evidence Rule is found in Federal Rules of 
Evidence 1001 to 1008.30 Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 sets forth 
the general Best Evidence Rule: “An original writing, recording, 
or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless 
these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.”31 Originally 
propounded in the pre-photocopy days when scriveners and 
scribes made handwritten copies of documents, the Best Evidence 
Rule is based upon the “understanding of the central position 
that the written word occupies in the law and the knowledge that 
‘a slight variation of words may mean a great difference in 
rights.’”32 Currently, a proponent seeking to prove the content of 
a writing, recording, or photograph can satisfy the Best Evidence 
Rule by (1) complying with Rule 1002 by producing the “original” 
                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Pridgen, 518 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) permits evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement to impeach a witness’s credibility even when the 
statements would not have been admissible as substantive evidence). 
 29. See FED. R. EVID. 613 (providing that extrinsic evidence of a witness’s 
prior inconsistent statement may be admissible “if the witness is given an 
opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an 
opportunity to examine the witness about it”). 
 30. See FED. R. EVID. 1001–1008 (listing rules regarding the admissibility of 
evidence used to establish the contents of an original writing, recording, or 
photograph). 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 32. Colin Miller, Even Better Than the Real Thing: How Courts Have Been 
Anything But Liberal in Finding Genuine Questions Raised as to the 
Authenticity of Originals Under Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. REV. 160, 166 (2008) 
(quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231, at 704 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 
1984)). 
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as defined in Rule 1001(d);33 (2) complying with Rule 100334 by 
producing a “duplicate” as defined in Rule 1001(e);35 
(3) complying with Rule 1004 by proving (a) a valid reason for 
nonproduction of the original or (b) that the original “is not 
closely related to a controlling issue;”36 or (4) having the opposing 
party admit to the content of the original under Rule 1007.37 
In some cases, a party will seek to prove the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph that does not contain a 
statement, meaning that there is no potential overlap between 
the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. For 
instance, in State v. Churchill,38 a police officer viewed security 
camera footage of a van entering and exiting a parking lot 
adjacent to a pizza parlor immediately before and after a safe was 
cracked in the parlor.39 Thereafter, the police officer testified at 
the defendant’s safecracking trial that he arrested the defendant 
in a van that looked similar to the van that he saw in the security 
footage.40 The Churchill court was forced to address the question 
of whether this testimony violated the Best Evidence Rule 
because the footage was not produced at trial, and the court’s 
analysis had nothing to do with the rule against hearsay because 
there was no statement contained in the footage.41 
In other cases, however, a party will seek to prove the 
content of a writing, recording, or photograph that does contain a 
statement, and most federal42 and state43 courts in such cases 
                                                                                                     
 33. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(d) (defining “original”). 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as 
the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity 
or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”). 
 35. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(e) (defining “duplicate” as a “counterpart 
produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other 
equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original”).  
 36. FED. R. EVID. 1004. 
 37. See FED. R. EVID. 1007 (“The proponent may prove the content . . . by 
the testimony . . . of the party against whom the evidence is offered.”). 
 38. No. 01CA14, 2002 WL 598315 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2002). 
 39. Id. at *2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at *6–7 (rejecting the argument that defense counsel’s failure to 
object to testimony that may have violated the Best Evidence Rule justified a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 42. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-
Ferrous Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 930, 989 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (“[Because the witness] 
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have conflated the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence 
Rule and deemed neither rule applicable if the party is not 
seeking to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement. 
Let us return to the hypothetical with a physical altercation 
ensuing between Dan and Vince soon after Ed tells Dan, “Vince is 
coming to see you to collect on that drug debt that you owe him.” 
Assume that Ed does not verbally make this statement to Dan 
but instead sends the statement to Dan in a text message. For 
the reasons stated above, Dan could testify about this text 
message without implicating the rule against hearsay because his 
testimony would be offered to prove that the message placed him 
in reasonable apprehension of Vince regardless of whether Ed’s 
statement was honest or accurate. Simply put, Dan’s testimony 
would not be proving the truth of the matter asserted in the text 
message. 
Assume, however, that Dan deletes Ed’s text message after 
the physical altercation because it mentions a drug debt, which 
could lead to Dan being investigated and possibly prosecuted for 
drug-related crimes. If Dan wants to testify concerning the text 
message to prove reasonable apprehension, there is no hearsay 
problem, but is there a Best Evidence problem? As noted, most 
courts answer this question in the negative by conflating the rule 
against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule and concluding that 
“[t]he best evidence rule is not applicable if the writing is not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter therein.”44 
 This juxtaposition is curious because the Best Evidence Rule 
makes no mention of “the truth of the matter asserted.” Instead, 
Rule 1002 indicates that the Best Evidence Rule is triggered 
when a party seeks “to prove [the] content” of a writing, recording 
or photograph.”45 For the conflation of the rule against hearsay 
and the Best Evidence Rule to be correct, “content” must be 
                                                                                                     
is not testifying to the contents of the writings or the truth of the matter 
asserted, hearsay and best evidence objections do not apply.”). 
 43. See, e.g., State v. Eubanks, 609 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (“The best evidence rule is not applicable if the writing is not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter therein.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
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analogous to “the truth of the matter asserted.” Such an analogy, 
however, does not hold water. 
 Merriam–Webster states that when the word “content” is 
used as a noun, it means “something contained” or “the topics or 
matter treated in a written work” such as a “table of contents.”46 
In the above example, then, the content of the text message is 
Ed’s statement about Vince coming to see Dan to collect the drug 
debt. Put another way, the “content” of a writing is “the matter 
asserted,” not “the truth of the matter asserted.” For the text 
message to have relevance under the Best Evidence Rule, Dan 
has to prove that the content of Ed’s statement was a warning 
about Vince coming to collect the drug debt because it was this 
“matter asserted” that allegedly placed Dan in reasonable 
apprehension of Vince. If Ed had instead texted Dan that Vince 
was coming over to give Dan a gift or return Dan’s lawnmower, 
Ed’s statement would have no relevance because a statement 
with this content would not have placed Dan in reasonable 
apprehension of Vince. 
 For similar reasons, in Abulqasim v. Mahmoud,47 discussed 
in the introduction, the court was wrong to conclude that the 
wife’s testimony about her husband’s “love letter” e-mail to the 
wife’s sister fell beyond the scope of the Best Evidence Rule.48 The 
wife claimed that the e-mail was relevant because it explained 
why she took the couple’s children and returned to the United 
States.49 That e-mail, however, was only relevant if the wife 
proved that the content of the e-mail was a declaration of love. If 
the husband was e-mailing the wife’s sister to set up a surprise 
birthday party for his wife, it would have no relevance because it 
would not provide a reasonable explanation for the wife leaving. 
 To date, seemingly only one court has explicitly recognized 
this distinction and disentangled the Best Evidence Rule from the 
rule against hearsay: the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in 
Kroh v. Kroh.50 In Kroh, a husband, Thomas Kroh, brought an 
                                                                                                     
 46. MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (11th ed. 2006). 
 47.  49 A.3d 828 (D.C. 2012). 
 48.  See id. at 837 (“The court exercised reasonable discretion by admitting 
the testimony . . . . [T]he best evidence rule did not apply.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 567 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
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action against his wife, Teresa Kroh, claiming that she had 
engaged in illegal wiretapping of his in-home conversations and 
actions.51 At trial, the wife sought to testify that she began 
wiretapping the husband’s conversations and activities because 
she found veterinary reports alleging that the husband had 
engaged in acts of bestiality with the family dog.52  
 The trial court deemed this proposed testimony inadmissible, 
and the Court of Appeals of North Carolina later agreed.53 The 
appellate court actually agreed with Teresa Kroh that she could 
testify concerning the veterinary reports for the non-hearsay 
purpose of proving the effect of reading the reports on her state of 
mind and the reason why she began wiretapping her husband.54 
Nonetheless, the court still deemed Teresa’s testimony 
inadmissible because she failed to produce or account for her 
nonproduction of the veterinary reports, meaning that she failed 
to satisfy the Best Evidence Rule.55 According to the court, the 
reports: 
[W]ere not relevant to Teresa Kroh’s state of mind except to 
the extent that she read them and interpreted them. As she 
was offering these reports into evidence to prove their contents 
(and how she interpreted those contents, regardless of their 
actual truth or falsity), Teresa Kroh was required to produce 
the original reports (under Rule 1002) . . . .56 
This analysis by the court gets to the heart of the issue. If a 
party is seeking to prove a statement’s “effect on the listener,” 
there is no problem under the rule against hearsay because the 
party can prove this effect without also proving the truth of the 
matter asserted. But if a party is seeking to prove a statement’s 
“effect on the reader,” there is a potential problem under the Best 
Evidence Rule because, to prove that effect, the party must prove 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 761. 
 52. Id. at 764. 
 53. See id. (concluding that the expert reports were properly excluded 
because the expert “failed to properly authenticate the proffered reports”). 
 54. See id. at 764–65 (suggesting that the reports could have been admitted 
into evidence had they been properly admitted under the rules of evidence). 
 55. See id. at 765 (excluding the report because “Teresa Kroh was required 
to produce the original reports . . . and to properly authenticate them” and she 
“failed to do so”). 
 56. Id. 
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two things: (1) the content of the statement; and (2) how the 
party interpreted that content. Without first proving the content 
of the statement, the party’s testimony about how she interpreted 
that content has no relevance.  
This is the fundamental distinction between the rule against 
hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. A statement offered to prove 
something other than the truth of the matter asserted is not 
hearsay because there is no point in calling the declarant to the 
witness stand as it is irrelevant whether the declarant was being 
honest or accurate in making the statement. Conversely, in 
Vince’s battery action against Dan, if Dan wants to testify that 
Ed sent him a text message warning him about Vince coming to 
collect a drug debt, it makes a great deal of sense for the text 
message to be admitted as an exhibit to see whether it actually 
contained such a warning and thus whether it could have placed 
Dan in reasonable apprehension of Vince. If the Best Evidence 
Rule did not apply to Dan’s testimony concerning the text 
message, the jury would simply have to take Dan at his word that 
he indeed received a text message with the claimed content, just 
as the jury in Abulqasim had to take the wife at her word that 
she read an e-mail in which her husband professed his love for 
the wife’s sister.57 
In both of these examples, the question is simply whether the 
statement, such as a statement with the content claimed by the 
party, was made, which, as noted above,58 is not the concern of 
the rule against hearsay. Courts conflating the Best Evidence 
Rule and the rule against hearsay fail to realize that the Best 
Evidence Rule is concerned with the question of whether a 
statement was made. Federal Rule of Evidence 1008 details the 
respective functions of the judge and the jury in resolving Best 
Evidence issues, and the jury is tasked with deciding 
“whether . . . an asserted writing, recording, or photograph ever 
existed.”59 
                                                                                                     
 57. Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 837–38 (D.C. 2012) (admitting 
the email into evidence “to the extent it explained Mahmoud’s actions” and not 
as evidence supporting the truth of the matter asserted). 
 58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (distinguishing evidentiary 
limitations based on personal knowledge, as opposed to the rule against 
hearsay). 
 59. FED. R. EVID. 1008. 
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The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Klopman v. Zurich American 
Insurance Co. of Illinois60 both illustrates this point and reveals 
the consequence of following the hearsay/Best Evidence 
conflation to its logical conclusion. In Klopman, a former tenant 
sued Andrew Klopman, his former landlord, for personal injuries 
connected to exposure to lead paint at the property the tenant 
rented from Klopman.61 Klopman thereafter brought a 
declaratory judgment action against Zurich American Insurance 
Company of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the insurance 
company was obligated to defend and indemnify him in the lead 
paint lawsuit pursuant to his insurance policy.62 The insurance 
company responded that it never issued such an insurance policy 
to Klopman, while Klopman claimed that the insurance policy 
was destroyed in a basement flood, meaning that he could testify 
about the contents of the policy pursuant to Rule 1004 because it 
was destroyed in the absence of bad faith.63 The Fourth Circuit 
found that Klopman’s proposed testimony was governed by the 
Best Evidence Rule, with the jury tasked under Rule 1008(a) with 
deciding whether an insurance policy ever issued.64 
It is no surprise that the Fourth Circuit found that the Best 
Evidence Rule applied to testimony concerning a contract—the 
insurance policy. The Best Evidence Rule can be traced all the 
way back to the pre-Roman inhabitants of England, who placed 
great importance on ceremony and “viewed written documents 
affecting property or contractual rights not as mere indicia of 
those rights, but as the rights themselves.”65 Thus, contracts and 
documents affecting property rights such as deeds were the 
original raison d’etre for the Best Evidence Rule. But, as noted, 
words of contract are not hearsay because they have independent 
                                                                                                     
 60. 233 F. App’x 256, 256–58 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 61. Id. at 257. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 257–59. 
 64. See id. at 258–60 (“[T]he trier of fact determines whether the asserted 
original ever existed and whether the other evidence accurately reflects the 
original’s content.”). 
 65. Cynthia A. De Silva, California’s Best Evidence Rule Repeal: Toward a 
Greater Appreciation for Secondary Evidence, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 646, 648 
(1999). 
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legal significance.66 Klopman was merely attempting to prove 
that the insurance company agreed to insure his property, which 
created a legally enforceable contract, not that it actually planned 
to honor the policy when push came to shove. 
Thus, for centuries, courts have applied the Best Evidence 
Rule to testimony concerning documents—contracts and deeds—
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted without ever 
acknowledging their conflation of that Rule with the rule against 
hearsay in other opinions. If we take this conflation to its logical 
conclusion, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply to contracts 
and deeds, a conclusion that would tear the heart—the very heart 
that gave life to the Rule—out of Rule 1002. 
While courts have not extended the Best Evidence Rule to 
this logical conclusion, which is really more of a logical extreme, 
they have frequently found that the Rule does not apply to 
evidence concerning statements offered to impeach witnesses. For 
instance, in State v. Stramiello,67 the defendant appealed his 
conviction for simple escape from a work release camp, claiming, 
inter alia, that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to 
question guards from the camp concerning a letter that the 
defendant allegedly used in making his escape.68 At trial, the 
defendant had testified “that he was in an amnesic state during 
the time he left the [work release] center and thus could not have 
the requisite intent to commit the crime of simple escape.”69 In 
response, the prosecution called guards to testify that the 
defendant showed them a letter from a trade school stating that 
the defendant was enrolled in a special class on the night of his 
escape.70  
Because it turned out that no class was scheduled on the 
night of the defendant’s escape, the prosecution’s theory was that 
the defendant forged the letter to facilitate his escape. The 
prosecution therefore argued to the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
that its failure to produce or account for the letter did not trigger 
                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Routt Cnty. v. O’Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 51 
(Colo. 1996) (noting that letters “are not ‘documents’ having independent legal 
significance such as contracts or deeds”). 
 67. 392 So. 2d 425 (La. 1980) 
 68. Id. at 428–29. 
 69. Id. at 429. 
 70. Id. 
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Best Evidence Rule scrutiny because it was merely using the 
letter to impeach the defendant and not to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in the letter: that the defendant was enrolled in a 
special class.71 The court agreed, concluding that: 
The best evidence rule is applicable only when the purpose of 
offering evidence of the writing is to establish the truth of 
statements contained therein. When evidence is not offered for 
the purpose of proving the truth of a writing’s contents, but for 
the purpose of impeaching a witness, the rule is not 
applicable. . . . In the instant case, the state was not 
attempting to prove the truth of the statements contained in 
the letter, that is, that defendant was enrolled in a special 
class that met on the evening in question. On the contrary, the 
state’s theory of the case was that defendant made his escape 
by presenting a letter which contained the falsehood that 
defendant was enrolled in the special class. The state used the 
testimony about the letter to impeach defendant’s claim that 
he was in an amnesic state during the time he left the center 
and thus could not have the requisite intent to commit the 
crime of simple escape. Hence, the best evidence rule is not 
applicable here.72 
 This conclusion once again illustrates the folly of conflating 
the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule. While the 
prosecution was not proving the truth of the matter asserted in 
the letter, surely it was seeking to prove the matter asserted in 
the letter—in other words, the letter’s content. The letter was 
only relevant to impeach the defendant if its content contradicted 
the content of the defendant’s testimony. In Stramiello, this 
meant that the letter was only relevant if its content was a 
fabricated message from the trade school falsely asserting that 
the defendant was enrolled in a special class. If the letter shown 
to guards by the defendant stated that he was having memory 
problems, or, indeed, if the letter was a genuine letter from the 
trade school that simply had the date of the class wrong, the 
letter would not be relevant to impeach the defendant because it 
would be consistent with his trial testimony. Simply put, in order 
for a party to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent 
statement, the party must first prove that the prior statement 
was indeed inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony, which 
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requires proof of the content of the prior statement. Therefore, 
when the prior statement is contained in a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the Best 
Evidence Rule. 
IV. Conclusion 
 The rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence Rule cover 
similar ground, but they do not cover the same ground. The rule 
against hearsay deems hearsay evidence presumptively 
inadmissible because of its unreliability, making the rule 
inapplicable when reliability is not an issue, such as when a 
party does not seek to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a 
statement. The Best Evidence Rule deems secondary evidence 
concerning the content of a writing, recording, or photograph 
presumptively inadmissible because the original is the best 
evidence of its own content. This means that the Rule is 
inapplicable when a party does not seek to prove the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph, but an original’s content is 
different from the truth of the matter asserted in the original. 
Content is the matter asserted in a writing, recording, or 
photograph, not the truth of that matter asserted. Therefore, 
courts conflating the rule against hearsay and the Best Evidence 
Rule have fundamentally misunderstood the Best Evidence Rule 
and must disentangle that Rule from the rule against hearsay. 
 
